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Abstract: This article proposes to study how national political parties frame the Eu-
ropean integration process, in order to better understand how Europe actually fig-
ures into national political discourses. We argue that framing strategies depend 
strongly on parties’ positions and standing. To verify our hypotheses, we will ac-
count for the fact that political parties’ arguments might be influenced by country-
specific characteristics and the specific issues being debated. Drawing on Haber-
mas’ typology of pragmatic-, identity- and value-related arguments, we provide so-
phisticated frame categorizations to capture the complex structure of argumenta-
tion, going beyond a simple dichotomization of economic and cultural frames. Re-
lying on a large and original media dataset for the period from 2004 to 2006 in six 
Western European countries, we will be in the position to test a series of hypothe-
ses that have so far only been tested in individual countries. 
 
Keywords: European integration process, Euroscepticism, framing, political parties 
 
 
Paper prepared for presentation at the annual meeting of the Swiss Political 
Science Association, University of St. Gallen, January 8, 2009 
 2 
Introduction 
Mair (2007: 162) has recently insisted that “in addition to the imputed location of a party’s 
core identity, and in addition to the evidence provided by the formal policies which it adopts 
or is obliged to adopt, we need to know more about how Europe actually plays in national 
political discourse, as well as about the way in which it is conceived […].” So far, studies 
investigating the integration process have mainly been concerned with whether the EU is ac-
tually an important issue in the public debate (Trenz 2003; de Vreese 2005), who participates 
in the debate (Koopmans 2007), how and why political actors and citizens position them-
selves towards the EU (Marks & Steenbergen 2004) or how the electorate behaves in Europe-
an elections (Marsh 1998; Hix & Marsh 2007).  
 
This article discusses an aspect of integration that has heretofore been neglected to a certain 
extent in the literature on the European integration process. Following from Mair’s assertion, 
we believe that, in addition to simply analyzing the positions of political actors, we must also 
consider why certain actors are against the European integration process, and why others are 
in favor of it. In addition, we should not simply look at which characteristics of political ac-
tors correlate with the respective positions, but also scrutinize which concrete arguments are 
mobilized to justify positions. The main aim of this paper is thus to investigate how the Euro-
pean integration process is framed by political parties at the national level. And more specifi-
cally, we are interested in differences between party-families and supporting and non-
supporting parties. We argue that framing strategies depend strongly on parties’ positions and 
standing, and agree with Diez Medrano (2003: 5), who holds that the attitudes of political 
actors towards objects or problems depend on how parties conceive or represent them. In oth-
er words, analyzing framing processes will give us a deeper insight in how the European inte-
gration process is perceived, and will help us better understand positions towards it. 
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A second, more descriptive aim of this article is to disaggregate the debate on the European 
integration process, and to show how extensive the argumentation is. In keeping with this 
aim, we shall pursue a nuanced and sophisticated means of frame categorization, in order to 
capture the various arguments that exist and to go beyond the simple differentiation between 
economic and cultural arguments. On the basis of Habermas’ (1993) typology of pragmatic-, 
identity- and value-related arguments, we will propose different useful categorizations. Dis-
aggregating the framing process also means that we look at how political parties argue in dif-
ferent situations. In order to test our arguments, which assert that differences in framing strat-
egies can be explained largely by the standing of a party and its position towards the Europe-
an integration process, we must verify whether their argumentations are influenced by factors 
that are specific to the respective national debates. In particular, we must consider the general 
political climate towards the integration process within a country, and the issues at stake that 
might have an impact on how political actors argue. On the one hand, we will control for the 
presence of right-wing populist parties that are particularly hostile towards the integration 
process, and the fact that some countries are generally more Eurosceptic than others. On the 
other hand, we will account for the fact that different issues that concern different aspects of 
the integration process are debated in various countries during the same period. 
 
To find answers to our questions we collected data on the basis of newspaper articles for the 
period 2004 to 2006 in six Western European countries: Austria, France, Germany, the Neth-
erlands, Switzerland and the United Kingdom. With such a large database at hand, we are in 
the position to test arguments that have already been formulated by other scholars, but only 
verified in individual countries. Moreover, by relying on media data instead of party programs 
or expert interviews, we can investigate the supply of politically relevant actors for the elec-
torate more precisely.  
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Framing positions towards the European integration process 
So far, most of the studies concerning people’s perceptions of the European integration pro-
cess have focused on how frames are used in the media. An important contribution has been 
made by de Vreese (2005: ch.4; see also de Vreese, Peter & Semetko 2001) who analyzed 
whether the media emphasize disagreements and conflicts between different entities when 
they cover the European integration process, or whether they frame events and issues in terms 
of their economic implications. Trenz (2005: 262-268) adopts similar frame categories to ours 
(see below), considering whether the arguments used in the media are interest-, value- or 
identity-related. Diez Medrano (2003: ch.4) is interested in how journalists present the EU in 
op-ed articles and how their opinions correspond with the attitudes of the populations. 
 
While theses studies help us understand how the EU is presented in different countries, they 
do not reveal much about the arguments of particular political actors. In this article we are not 
so much interested in the role and strategies of the media as we are in understanding how po-
litical parties justify their attitudes towards the European integration process. Very few stud-
ies have focused on this question so far. One of those studies has been executed by Statham 
and Grey (2005) in the United Kingdom. They identify three conceptual lenses through which 
political actors formulate the relationship to Europe: political, economic and cultural-
historical (Statham & Grey 2005: 74). And through their analysis, they show that Eurosceptic 
conservatives rely heavily on political arguments, while pro-Europeans from both major Brit-
ish parties emphasize economic arguments. By showing that only a modest number of politi-
cal actors uses cultural and historical arguments, they further confirm their expectation that 
Euroscepticism is only populist to a limited extent, and is cultural in nature (see also Statham 
2008: 38). 
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Van Os (2005) explores the framing of Europe by French political parties on the basis of the 
contents of their respective websites. He also distinguishes interest/instrumental, identity, and 
value frames—revealing that both defenders and opponents of the European integration pro-
cess refer to strategic actions and specific interests when discussing this issue. Regarding the 
two other groups of frames, it is interesting to see that the major forces opposing the EU—the 
Front National and the Mouvement pour la France—adopt arguments that are different form 
all other parties. While all established parties demonstrate something resembling a European 
identity, and mention democratic values when referring to this supranational entity, the Right-
wing populists defend a national identity and do not use universal value frames at all. 
 
It is useful, here, to differentiate between supporting and non-supporting political parties. By 
looking at positions and justifications together, we learn to differentiate between arguments 
that are mobilized to support the integration process, and those that are used to criticize it. 
Diez Medrano (2003) shows that integration’s supporters emphasize economic advantages 
conferred by the unification of the market, as well as the EU’s expected contribution to peace 
and a better understanding between peoples. Non-supporters, on the other hand, emphasize 
potential threats to national identity and sovereignty that could be brought on by integration. 
In addition to these patterns, we hypothesize that integration’s supporters lead a much more 
pragmatic discourse, focusing on concrete problems, since they have accepted the EU as a 
historical fact, contrary to Eurosceptics who mobilize fundamental and ideological arguments. 
 
Koopmans (2007) has revealed that patterns of support for and opposition to the European 
integration process are strongly related to the standings of political actors. While prominent 
actors are mostly in favor of integration, less influential actors tend to be more critical of Eu-
ropean institutions. Other studies focusing on political parties came to similar conclusions. A 
recurrent theme in the literature is the inverted ‘U’ pattern of party alignments on Europe (Hix 
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& Lord 1997; Marks & Wilson 2000; Hooghe et al. 2004). According to this thesis, opposi-
tion to Europe comes from the far left and the far right while centre parties generally hold a 
pro-integrationist stance. We expect majority and minority parties to differ not only in terms 
of their positions, but also in terms of their arguments. Following the hypotheses we have 
formulated above, we argue that established parties would also lead a much more economic 
and political discourse than their less established counterparts, with particularly far-right par-
ties emphasizing cultural arguments most. 
 
It is up for debate, however, whether the ‘permissive consensus’ among mainstream political 
parties still exists on European integration, or whether critical voices have also gained influ-
ence within major political parties. Statham (2008) has observed that in the last years, Euro-
scepticism has become more important among mainstream parties. Kriesi (2007: 88) argues 
that established conservative parties are likely to take an accommodating stance towards the 
Euroscepticism of minor right-wing populist parties, in order to close off their niche in the 
electoral market. Consequently, Kriesi et al. (2006; 2008) argue that the issue of European 
integration has become more salient and more controversial in countries where Right-wing 
populists have gained power in the last decade. The influence of Right-wing populists is 
mainly due to the fact that, by adopting a general pro-integrationist stance, the established 
parties have long ignored the part of the electorate that is opposed to a further integration pro-
cess (Hix & Lord 1997). Kriesi et al. (2006; 2008) further emphasize that, partly because of 
the mobilization by Right-wing populists, identity and cultural aspects bear a lot of Euroscep-
tic potential. Similarly, Hooghe and Marks (2009, forthcoming) argue that the mobilization of 
exclusive national identity among mass publics, by parties who emphasize traditionalism, 
authority and nationalism (their famous tan-dimension), has had an important impact on the 
debate in recent years. Because of this, it will be interesting to see whether the presence of 
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right-wing populist parties has an influence on the way political parties argue at the national 
level. 
 
This will also give us the opportunity to control for country-specific characteristics. In order 
to test our arguments concerning the framing strategies of political parties, we must verify 
whether or not their argumentations are influenced by factors that are specific to their respec-
tive national debates. Following from our idea to differentiate between supporting and non-
supporting parties, we endeavor to differentiate between countries that are strongly in favor of 
integration, and those where a majority opposes further European integration. It might be that 
the general positive or negative climate in a country has an impact on the discourse of indi-
vidual political parties. For the six countries under investigation in this paper, Kriesi (2007) 
has already shown that Euroscepticism is particularly widespread in the UK and the non-
member state of Switzerland.  
 
Furthermore, we must consider whether we fall short of understanding how the European in-
tegration process is perceived, especially if we do not differentiate between different sub-
issues. It may very well be that political parties do not simply support or refuse the integration 
process. Indeed, it seems wise to expect variations across policy fields. Since European inte-
gration consists of economic, political and cultural projects, parties might take diverging posi-
tions (see Marks 2004: 241-343; Marks, Hooghe & Wilson 2004). For example, parties of the 
center-left are often said to be in favor of more integration if particular projects focus on 
‘market-regulation’. Social democrats are in favor of diminishing cultural boundaries, but 
simultaneously are afraid of losing social achievements at the national level. On the other side 
of the political spectrum, those on the right increase their opposition to integration when the 
process concerns more than a simple economic and monetary union. Liberal conservative 
parties often support further integration as long as it mainly concerns market liberalization, 
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and oppose further integration when political or cultural aspects are concerned (Kriesi 2007: 
86-87). It will be interesting to see whether such differences can also be observed through the 
frames that are used in the context of the various sub-issues of the European integration pro-
cess. To this end, we will investigate whether the framing strategies found in the general de-
bates on the European integration process are the same across subfields. Before we test these 
arguments, however, we will more precisely specify what we understand by ‘framing,’ and 
which particular frame categories we shall use for our analyses. 
 
Clarifying and distinguishing our framing approach 
According to a highly influential definition by Robert Entman, framing means to “select some 
aspects of a perceived reality and make them more salient in a communicating text, in such a 
way as to promote a particular problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation, 
and/or treatment recommendation” (1993: 52, italics in original). Unlike agenda-setting, 
which is primarily concerned with salience, framing not only tells people what to think about, 
but more importantly, how to think about a particular issue. The underlying assumption of the 
approach is that the way an issue is presented in the media can influence how it is understood 
and evaluated by the audience (Scheufele & Tewksbury 2007: 11). The evaluation of abortion 
polices, to mention a classic example, sharply differs if one thinks of abortion as a question of 
life or death, or if it is framed as a matter of women’s rights and civil liberties (see Ferree et 
al. 2002). Empirical studies show that framing has a clear effect on individual attitudes, even 
in a conflictive environment where competing frames are at work (e.g. Zaller 1992: ch.9; 
Brewer & Gross 2005; Chong & Druckmann 2007; skeptical Sniderman & Theriault 2004). 
 
While the term frame denotes the “schemata of interpretation” (Goffman 1974: 21)—systems 
that guide our perception of reality—framing refers to the more or less consciously managed 
process, by which these schemata are manufactured, selected, distributed and adopted. For 
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public political contestations, this process can be divided into four distinct stages (Matthes 
2007: ch.2). In the first stage, frames are promoted by competing political actors. Drawing on 
established cultural resources, they adopt a framing strategy that aims to create a maximum of 
public support. Because of this, this stage is called strategic framing. However, it must be 
noted that political actors’ statements typically do not get direct public attention. Before being 
published and becoming part of the public debate, they pass through a second stage where 
they are selected and arranged by journalists. This procedure provides the latter with the op-
portunity to (re-)frame particular statements or whole articles, according to the norms and 
routines of the media system (journalistic framing). These processes result in frames that dic-
tate how these issues appear in mass media products, e.g. newspapers (third stage). The fourth 
and final stage witnesses the impact of these frames on individuals’ attitudes, and their own 
framing of issues (the framing effects).  
 
The frames that we investigate in our study can be conceptualized as the outcome of the 
“framing contest” (Gamson 2004: 245) between political actors of the first stage, partly modi-
fied by journalists’ mediation efforts during the second stage. Furthermore, the practical rele-
vance of these media frames during the third stage stems from the fact that they decisively 
shape how the debated issue is perceived by the audience, thereby influencing individuals’ 
attitudes in the fourth stage of the framing process. In contrast to the majority of media fram-
ing studies, which typically focus on the whole article (e.g. de Vreese 2005; Trenz 2003), we 
analyze media frames on a propositional level. This means that we coded frames for every 
statement in an article, and that these frames had to be clearly attributable to a particular polit-
ical actor (see below). This idea of “frame ownership” enables us to keep the aspect of strate-
gic framing central to our analysis, as we not only pursue the question of how the debate is 
framed, but also, and just as importantly, by whom.  
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As stated above, we are interested in the framing of issue positions by political actors in the 
mass media, and therefore propose to define frames as patterns of justification. We would like 
to know which justifications are put forward by a political actor to support his or her position 
regarding a particular issue. We have to keep in mind, however, that in reality, political actors 
do not argue as consistently and explicitly as we, as political scientists, would wish them to 
do so. Quite often they evoke a particular argumentative context by dropping a few keywords, 
or rely on metaphors and symbols. Consequentially, the term “pattern of justification” is un-
derstood here in a fairly broad sense, and also includes rather latent and implicit arguments.  
 
It is worth noting that our definition of frames bears resemblance to Entman’s “problem-
definition” aspect in his above-mentioned, broadly encompassing definition of what framing 
is. One could go even further—thinking of the attributed issue in a statement as a “treatment 
recommendation”, and thinking of an actor’s stance (position) as an element of the “evalua-
tive component” of a frame (see also Matthes 2007: 127-130). However, for our analysis it is 
most useful to keep justifications, actors, issues and positions separated. We will use our more 
narrow definition, and restrict the meaning of the term “frame” to patterns of justifications.  
 
Categorizing frames 
In order to systematically structure the various frames, which are attributed to policy positions 
in the mass media debate, we draw on a distinction made by Habermas (1993), which has 
proven useful for the study of multilayered issues like the European integration (Sjursen 
2002; Trenz 2005; Lerch & Schwellnus 2006). Habermas’s (1993) typology distinguishes 
three types of possible frames: pragmatic, identity-based and moral-universal frames. The 
first type, pragmatic, consists of arguments referring to the expected utility of a policy. A 
pragmatic frame justifies a position by its ability to reach a specific goal, or by its potential to 
meet particular interests (Lerch & Schwellnus 2006: 306). The second type consists of posi-
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tions that can be justified by identity-based arguments. These frames legitimize policies by 
pointing to ideas and values inherent to a particular community. The third type, moral-
universal arguments, is exploited by actors referring to “universal standards of justice“ 
(Sjursen 2002: 494f.), which can be accepted by everyone, regardless of his or her particular 
interests or cultural identity. 
 
In order to expand upon existing studies that use these three frame categories, and in order to 
meet our research goals, we propose some additional categorizations (see Table 1). Early on, 
our research objectives lead us to look more closely at the content of the three frame catego-
ries. Within the pragmatic category, we delineated between political, economic, and other 
pragmatic reasons. Political reasons concern the efficiency of the political system or are di-
rectly connected either to a strategy of a specific actor, or to a procedural process. Economic 
reasons comprise welfare, budgetary and private sector frames. Other pragmatic reasons is a 
residual category, consisting of less salient frames like ecology, security and infrastructural 
reasons. 
 
-- Table 1 about here -- 
 
The identity-based frames can be separated into national-exclusive and national-institutional 
frames. The first subcategory summarizes nationalistic and xenophobic frames, as well as 
those emphasizing the preservation of traditional values. National-institutional frames include 
arguments related to political self-determination and national independence. These frame 
types are both used by political actors who prefer closed cultural boundaries and a culturally 
homogeneous society. By contrast, multicultural-inclusive reasons contain opposing argu-
ments such as cultural plurality and tolerance. The last of the three main categories, moral-
universal frames, is not further differentiated. It is composed of general moral principles like 
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peace or equality of opportunities, and their legalistic counterparts—basic civic and political 
rights. 
 
A second additional categorization aims at aggregating the three main categories. In order to 
test how important cultural frames are in the debate on European integration, we seek to cre-
ate a category that includes all frames that are cultural in nature. While pragmatic types of 
frames can be perceived as arguments following an instrumental rationality (Sjursen 2002), 
both identity-based and moral-universal types can be understood in a Weberian sense as cul-
tural frames (Weber 1921[1980]: 12). These arguments emanate from the same source—that 
is to say, from a rationale based on moral, religious or ethnical values, norms or habits in op-
positon to the utilitaristic interest characterizing the pragmatic frames. Thus, we have two 
distinct justification patterns for a policy position, the first being utilitaristic (or pragmatic) in 
nature and containing the reasoning for the political or economic interest, and the second be-
ing cultural and containing values deduced from identity or moral principles. 
 
Having three different kinds of categorizations at hand, we end up with a list of frames that 
can be generalized in a flexible way to fit our specific research questions. One aim of this 
study is to test whether political, economic or cultural frames are more often used when posi-
tions are taken towards the European integration process. To this end, we will compare the 
cultural frames at the highest level of aggregation with the economic and political reasons at 
the lowest level of aggregation. We expect that opposition parties (Right-wing populists and 
Radical left parties) will be shown to adopt a more fundamental ideological discourse, while 
mainstream parties who are part of the ‘permissive consensus’ use more pragmatic frames 
(political and economic reasons). To better understand how cultural frames are used, we will 
investigate whether supporters of the EU prefer to use multicultural-inclusive and moral-
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universalist frames, and if non-supporters conversely tend to mobilize national-exclusive and 
national-institutional arguments. 
 
Data collection and methods 
In order to achieve a comprehensive picture of the debate over the European integration pro-
cess, we have conducted a comparative study of six Western European countries (Austria, 
France, Germany, the Netherlands, Switzerland and the United Kingdom). Since our data 
originated from a larger research project, the countries were selected for purposes different 
from the ones we pursue here. For the present analysis, it would certainly have been interest-
ing to include South European countries and some new member states. Nonetheless, the six 
countries under investigation demonstrate significant variety, in terms of factors of interest, 
for our analyses. They have different party systems (especially with regard to the presence of 
right wing parties); different issues have been debated in the period under investigation; and 
they include two particularly Eurosceptical countries (GB, CH). More generally, our sample 
consists of small (A, CH, NL) and large countries (D, F, GB), of core member states (D, F, 
NL), states that joined the EU later (A, GB) and a non-member state (CH). 
 
We collected data from newspaper articles published in the three-year period (2004, 2005 and 
2006), which enables us to observe the most recent development of the debate. There is little 
doubt in the literature that the mass media constitute the most important arena for public de-
bates on politically relevant issues (see Ferree et al. 2002; Bennett et al. 2004). An analysis of 
newspaper articles thus allows us to analyze the statements of political actors, as they are di-
rectly perceived by their opponents, policy makers and by a broader audience. Practical limi-
tations prevented us from being able to include more than one newspaper per country in the 
analysis. The newspaper sample contains Le Monde in France, The Times in the United King-
dom, the Süddeutsche Zeitung in Germany, the NRC Handelsblad in the Netherlands, Die 
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Presse in Austria and the Neue Zürcher Zeitung in Switzerland. We decided to rely on the 
most widespread quality newspapers in each country, since they are most likely to exert a key 
influence on other media actors. These newspapers exhibit a high probability for being read 
by other domestic journalists, and a high probability for influencing the editorial decisions of 
other news organizations (Bennett et al. 2004: 445). Furthermore, Koopmans and Statham 
(1999: 207) have shown in their Political Claims Analysis approach—a method comparable to 
ours in terms of basic coding instructions—that there are no significant differences in the po-
sitioning of political actors between quality newspapers and tabloids. 
 
Our content analysis is based on an innovative approach of selecting newspaper articles while 
simultaneously collecting data. We apply a three-step procedure to obtain a representative 
sample of relevant articles. The first step is the identification of events in each country that 
are relevant to the European integration process. The events are identified by means of vari-
ous yearbooks such as Keesing's World Record of Events and Facts on Files (World News 
Digest Yearbook). This list of events constitutes the basis for the development of an extensive 
keyword list for each country, and greatly assisted us in finding all relevant articles.1 Indeed, 
relying on event lists yielded a significant advantage in that it allowed us to know about the 
relevant discussions in each country before deploying a keyword search. This is especially 
important for a complex issue such as European integration, which is disputed in many differ-
ent ways, in every country. By these means, we have been able to minimize the risk of ne-
glecting important aspects in our selection procedure (false negatives).  
 
Since we were still confronted with an immense number of articles per newspaper (approxi-
mately 30’000 per country), we engaged another selection step. Following our aim to grasp 
the core of the debate on European integration (i.e. to include only the most relevant articles 
                                                
1 All the newspaper titles in our sample are accessible electronically via the databases Factiva or LexisNexis. 
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into our content analysis) we grouped the events into sub-issues and ranked them according to 
their salience in the basic sample. Only the most salient sub-issues were implemented in the 
next selection step, which allowed us to reduce the samples to approximately 3’000 to 4’000 
per country. 
 
In the third and final step, we chronologically drew a random sample of 1’200 articles per 
country out of the sub-issue selection. A chronological selection helped us account for the 
dynamic of the debate. Time-invariant newspaper selection procedures—e.g. the selection of 
all articles published on a certain weekday—fail to capture the differences in the intensity of a 
debate and do not account for periods in which a greater volume of articles are published. By 
contrast, a chronological random sampling follows the occurrence distribution of relevant 
articles and, therefore, the peaks and troughs of the debate. 
 
The articles selected are coded sentence-by-sentence, using the method of ‘nuclear sentences'. 
This approach has its origins in early theoretical elaborations by Wittgenstein (1984 [1921]) 
and was first practically implemented in concrete coding instructions by Osgood (1956) and 
Axelrod (1976). Recently, it has been revived for the analysis of party systems (Kriesi et al. 
2006; Kleinnijenhuis, de Ridder & Rietberg 1997). Additionally, Franzosi (2004: 60f.) has 
provided theoretical and empirical evidence that the method—which he calls ‘story gram-
mars’—is a useful device for the social sciences in general. ‘Nuclear sentences’ represent an 
inductive approach that aims to capture the full complexity of the political debate without 
imposing strong theoretical expectations (e.g. in terms of previously fixed category schemas) 
on the data. 
 
The basic idea of this method comes in the notion that both the latent and manifest content of 
every written document can be described as a network of relationships between objects. For 
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the purpose of our project, we coded every relationship between 'political objects' (i.e. be-
tween a political actor and a political issue) that appears in the text. Each sentence is reduced 
to its most basic structure (the so-called ‘nuclear sentence'), indicating only its subject (politi-
cal actor) and its object (issue), as well as the direction of the relationship between the two. 
The direction is quantified using a scale ranging from ‘-1’ to ‘+1’ (with three intermediary 
positions). In substantive terms, such a nuclear sentence represents an actor’s opinion on an 
issue. Each of these positions is complemented by up to five justifications, by which actors 
may explain and endorse their statement. This multiplicity of justifications results from the 
fact that actors often back their policy position by invoking multiple frames, either to discuss 
a complex issue persuasively, or to gain support from different audiences at the same time 
(Lerch & Schwellnus: 307). Table 2 gives a short, illustrative example of a nuclear sentence. 
 
-- Table 2 about here -- 
 
As Kriesi et al. (2006) have shown, we can investigate the supply of politically relevant actors 
for the electorate more precisely with media data than is possible with more common data, 
like party manifesto data, expert surveys, or roll call data. Newspapers are a better tool for 
grasping new issues, and for understanding the direct confrontation between political actors. 
Furthermore, it is argued that a political party’s image is much better represented in the media 
than in party manifestos, which hardly any ordinary citizen reads. 
 
The European integration debate in six Western European countries  
We shall now turn our attention to the empirical results of our study. Before we test our hy-
potheses concerning the framing of the European integration process, this first section shall 
provide the necessary context, by presenting an overview of how the public debate in the 
years 2004-2006 is thematically structured in the six countries under study. Table 3 reports 
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the salience of the various European-integration issues (i.e. their relative share of nuclear sen-
tences in the media coverage). As could be expected for a debate that is highly driven by 
events and institutional actors on the European level, we observe a fairly similar pattern 
across countries: by far, the two most salient issues in all member states are the enlargement 
process—which includes the accession of Romania and Bulgaria (southeastern enlargement) 
and the question of Turkey’s membership, and the constitutional treaty. On average, these 
two key issues account for more than half of the media coverage, and heavily dominate the 
debate. The enlargement process is by far the most important issue in Austria and Germany 
with a salience of 51 and 40 per cent, respectively. In the UK, France, and the Netherlands, 
the constitutional treaty ranks number one with 34, 36 and 27 per cent, respectively. This is-
sue’s comparatively high salience in the UK is somewhat surprising, as—unlike in France and 
the Netherlands—no referendum was held there during the time period under study. 
 
An unsurprising exception to this general pattern is found in Switzerland, which shows a less-
er, yet still considerable interest in the enlargement process (13 per cent) and the constitu-
tional treaty (19 per cent), particularly for a non-EU member state. Here, it is clear that the 
focus of the debate rested on the then-ongoing second round of bilateral negotiations with the 
European Union. The two most controversial issues of these bilateral treaties were the exten-
sion of the agreement on the free movement of persons to the new CEE EU-member states, 
and the Schengen/Dublin accord2, both finally approved by the Swiss citizens in a referen-
dum. Taken together, these three issues account for 50 per cent of all statements in Switzer-
land. 
 
-- Table 3 about here -- 
                                                
2 As the Schengen agreement and the Dublin convention are part of the “Area of freedom, security and justice”, 
we subsume them under the label security. 
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There are a few other country-specific characteristics worth mentioning. Infringements of the 
stability pact drew considerable public attention to the monetary union in four of the five 
member countries (more than 9 percent salience in Austria, the UK, Germany and the Nether-
lands). Unlike the other countries, the UK demonstrated heightened interest in the budgetary 
framework for 2007-13 (14 per cent), fiercely defending the “British rebate” against concerted 
attacks from other member states. Another country specific characteristic is found in the high 
salience of questions of market liberalization and (re-)regulation in France. These two eco-
nomic issues, two sides of the same coin, account together for 20 per cent of all statements in 
the French debate.  
 
In addition to salience, polarization is another indicator of political relevance, and is of strong 
interest to us. To this end, Table 3 also reports the mean value of all positions on a given issue 
for each country.  A value of ‘+1’ or ‘-1’ would represent perfect positive or negative unanim-
ity among political actors, whereas a value close to ‘0’ would indicate that they are deeply 
divided on a certain issue. In all member countries, we observe a high overall level of polari-
zation (values close to 0), which supports the claim that the days of the (permissive) consen-
sus in European integration politics are over (Hooghe and Marks 2007) on a very general lev-
el. Only the UK debate is considerably less polarized, adopting a generally Eurosceptical atti-
tude (-0.30)— a finding that is substantiated by the almost identical negative value for the 
issue EU-integration in general. This skeptical attitude towards the EU has also been ob-
served in British parties by Statham (2008: 19) in a less recent period of time, and is ex-
plained by Diez Medrano (2003) vis-à-vis the distinct historical legacy of the Empire. Swit-
zerland proves to be an outlier once again, strongly in favor of European integration (0.29). 
However, this finding should be interpreted with some reservations, considering the non-
member status of Switzerland and the fact that the highly controversial question of EU-
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membership was largely absent from the debate during the period under study. Moreover, the 
bilateral treaties were also supported by Eurosceptics, who conceived them as a viable alter-
native to accession.  
 
Let us now turn our attention to the core question of how the European integration process is 
framed. In pursuing our first step we are interested simply in the larger picture, aiming to 
show how the various issues we identified in the preceding part are framed (see Table 4). All 
the following tables are structured as follows: the first three rows list the different pragmatic 
frames; the fourth row lists the aggregated cultural arguments, which consist of Habermas’s 
identity and value frames. In the lower part of each table we disaggregate the cultural frames 
according to the frame structure we presented in the section on frame categorization. 
 
As Table 4 shows, five out of the ten main issues—namely monetary union, market liberali-
zation, regulation, free movement of persons and the bilateral treaties—are framed in pre-
dominantly economic terms. Political actors place these issues in the context of welfare, un-
employment, economic gains, or budgetary constraints. If the debate consisted largely of the-
se issues, one might convincingly argue that European integration would be best described as 
an integral part of the classic economic dimension of political conflict, as the regulation mod-
el proposes (see Steenbergen & Marks 2004).  
 
-- Table 4 about here -- 
 
However, there is a second, much more salient cluster of issues at play, which includes EU-
integration in general, the constitutional treaty, enlargement, the EU-budget and security. 
These issues all demonstrate a comparatively low share of economic arguments, and are 
framed largely in terms of culture: Identity-based arguments in favor of national exclusion, 
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independence, and multiculturalism on the one hand, and moral-universalistic justifications 
like justice or solidarity on the other. Additionally, it is worth noting that the two most salient 
issues by far—the constitutional treaty and the enlargement process—feature a share of iden-
tity-based frames that is above average. This seems to confirm what we have already found, 
with regard to the demand side of the political market— namely, that questions of identity 
(and cultural motives in general) are the driving force of the growing Euroscepticism (Hooghe 
& Marks 2004; Hooghe, Marks & Wilson 2004).  
 
From this, it becomes quite clear that European integration cannot be understood through a 
single economic or cultural dimension. It is also clear that utilitarian political motives account 
for a smaller, but still non-negligible share across these issues. The complex, multi-faceted 
nature of European integration issues seems to give leeway to political actors—allowing them 
flexibility when presenting these issues to their constituency. We will explore this further in 
the following section.  
 
The framing of the debate by political actors 
In analyzing Table 5, we shall first consider the overall pattern of frames used in arguments 
supporting or opposing European integration. Previously we had hypothesized that supporters 
of integration would frame arguments predominantly in economic, political and moral-
universalist terms, while those opposed to integration would likewise employ case identity-
related frames.3 However, if we consider the three main groups of frames (political, economic 
and cultural), it is clear that supporters and dissenters pursue a similar discourse on integra-
tion. Contrary to Medrano’s argument, economic frames are even more prevalent among 
statements that espouse negative attitudes towards the EU. Moreover, it is clear that the Euro-
                                                
3 The two groups of supporters and nonsupporters include all actors that participate in the debate: political par-
ties, governments, EU-actors, interest groups, experts, unions and actors from countries that do not belong to our 
six cases etc. 
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pean integration process is perceived on both sides as a cultural and political entity, as much 
as it is considered as an economic space. However, while the non-supporters of the European 
integration process mobilize national-exclusive and national-institutional frames more often 
than the supporters, the latter are much more inclined to use multicultural-inclusive and mor-
al-universalist arguments. Surprisingly, the last group of frames is also used quite often by 
critics of the EU. If we look at the two groups of nationalistic frames, which differentiate be-
tween pro-sovereignty and civic nationalist frames on the one hand, and xenophobic/ethnic 
nationalist arguments on the other hand, we see that both are equally important—a finding 
that partially contradicts Statham and Grey’s (2005) findings. It is true, however, that nation-
alistic frames are of minor importance overall, even among the opponents. This finding sup-
ports Statham’s (2008: 38) general argument, that a large majority of Eurosceptic positions 
are reasoned arguments. 
 
-- Table 5 about here-- 
 
In the next step, we seek to gain a more nuanced picture by investigating how political parties 
justify their positions.4 In order to better understand the different types of argumentation, and 
to link these findings to our prior discussion on the arguments of supporters and non-
supporters, we indicate each party-family’s position towards the European integration process 
at the very bottom of Table 5. It comes as no surprise that the extremist parties at the right and 
the left strongly oppose the current European integration process while the established Social 
democrats, Liberals, and Greens are clearly in favor of the European integration process. The 
                                                
4 We regrouped all political parties into six party-families: Radical left, Greens, Social democrats, Liberals, Con-
servatives and Right-wing populists. The attribution of the individual parties is specified in the notes of Table 5. 
All political actors whose party affiliation could be identified were allotted to the respective party-groups. Thus, 
also actors that took positions, for example, in their function as head of states or ministers are included in the 
analysis. 
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conservative parties take a rather ambivalent position. Collectively, these parties can be seen 
as the ‘permissive consensus’ in the center of the political spectrum. 
 
Overall, we see a clear difference of argumentation between major established parties that are 
in favor of the European integration process, and the minor left and right-wing parties that are 
much more critical. We also observe a kind of ‘U’ pattern, with regard to the use of frames. 
Again, the findings contradict the predictions of scholars who expect supporters to pursue a 
mainly economic discourse. With the exception of the Social Democrats, economic frames are 
used much more intensively by the Radical left and the Right-wing populists. The established 
parties, by contrast, justify their positive positions with political arguments, and thereby refer 
to the efficiency of the political system and to procedural questions. The very high number of 
economic frames used by the Radical left confirms the widely held argument that those forces 
oppose the current integration process, perceiving the EU as a neo-liberal construction, and 
seeking to protect the national workforces. Surprisingly, at least the last aspect also seems to 
be of importance for those at the other end of the political spectrum. Almost half of all argu-
ments used by the Right-wing populists fall into the cultural group, however. At the disaggre-
gated level, we see that they use national-exclusive and national-institutional frames much 
more often than the other parties, by far. This finding supports the theories of those authors 
who argue that opponents from the right argue mainly in cultural terms. It is interesting to 
observe that the Right-wing populists mobilize arguments based on political self-
determination and national-independence more frequently than they do xenophobic frames. 
All the other parties use the moral-universalist justifications much more often. Especially in 
the cases of the Radical left and the Greens, which are often considered as post-materialist 
forces, moral-universalist discourses are quite important. The Greens also strongly emphasize 
pragmatic ecological frames, which are included in the category “other pragmatic”, more of-
ten than the other party groups. 
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Country-specific differences in the framing of political parties 
Having observed different framing strategies among party-families, the next question we 
would like to address is whether these patterns vary between the supporting and Eurosceptic 
countries, and whether the presence of Right-wing populist forces has a noticeable impact on 
these patterns. Table 6 shows the framing of all party actors in a country, as well as the dis-
course of Right-wing populists in countries where they constitute a relevant political force. 
While they are traditionally weak in the United Kingdom and in Germany, it came as a sur-
prise that we did not find enough observations for Right-wing populists in Austria—the Free-
dom Party (FPÖ) and the Alliance for the Future of Austria (BZÖ)—to include them in our 
analyses. It might be that the FPÖ — the major right-wing populist force in this country—
kept a low profile in criticizing the EU, as they were part of the coalition government during 
the first half of our investigative period. The subsequent 2005 split-up, into a more moderate 
and a more radical faction, did not have an observable impact on the low standing of these 
two right-wing populist parties.   
 
-- Table 6 about here -- 
 
As we have already seen in Table 3, Euroscepticism is particularly widespread in the United 
Kingdom. Although we found highly positive values for Switzerland for reasons we have al-
ready discussed, Switzerland is also often considered to be particularly hostile towards the 
European integration process (Kriesi 2007). However, it is difficult to see a systematic differ-
ence of argumentation in these two countries. While the national-exclusive and national-
institutional frames are slightly more prevalent on average in the UK than in the other coun-
tries, it is clear that, in Switzerland especially, national-exclusive arguments are quite rare 
even among the Right-wing populists. 
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The Swiss dynamic can be explained by the fact that, during the period of our investigation, a 
major referendum was held concerning the bilateral treaties with the European Union. One of 
the major issues at stake was the free movement of persons, which was mainly discussed in 
terms of the economic implications of the introduction of such a regime. An important argu-
ment in this context was that the opening of the borders would lead to higher unemployment 
and decreasing social security standards. While explicitly economic, this argumentation has at 
least some latent xenophobic connotations. Furthermore, if Switzerland had to decide on full 
EU-membership, we would certainly have seen a more culturally driven debate on Swiss 
identity, sovereignty, and the role of central political institutions (such as the direct democrat-
ic regime). However, the prevalence of economic frames in the context of the bilateral treaties 
referendum also must be seen in the light of the specific role and the position of the Swiss 
People’s Party (SVP)—the major right-wing populist force in this country. Contrary to the 
Right-wing populists in other countries, the SVP is an established political force. Moreover, 
and contrary to its image among the electorate, the SVP is also very much concerned with 
economic issues, such as tax and budget reduction (Mudde 2007: 123; Kriesi et al. 2005). 
 
Looking at Table 6, it is clear that Right-wing populists in the Netherlands and France rarely 
pursue an economic discourse, and that they employ national-institutional and (to an even 
greater degree) national-exclusive arguments much more than other parties.5 France and the 
Netherlands also represent the two cases where cultural frames are much more widespread 
than in other countries. However, the presence of right-wing populist forces does not seem to 
lead to a more nationalist discourse among other parties. On the contrary, we see that their 
cultural arguments consist mainly of multicultural and moral-universalist frames. It might be 
that, in these two countries, the discourse of the Right-wing populists was not adopted by oth-
                                                
5 It thus appears that despite country weights the high number of economic frames for right-wing populists that 
we observed in Table 5 is mainly due to the discourse of the Swiss People’s Party (SVP). 
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er parties, but instead led to an important counter mobilization. It might also be that the refer-
endum on the European Constitution that was held in these two countries during our period of 
investigation has given rise to an excessive use of cultural frames. Overall, we can conclude 
that the two country-specific characteristics, ‘presence of right-wing populist forces’ and 
‘widespread Euroscepticism,’ have no impact on the argumentation of other parties. 
 
Issues and framing 
In this final empirical section, we would like to discuss whether the frame patterns we ob-
served among political parties are the same across all the important issues of the European 
integration process, or whether the way the EU is perceived also depends on the different as-
pects of this process. We have already shown that two broad categories of issues can be dis-
tinguished in the debate on European integration, according to how they are framed (see Ta-
ble 4). There is a clear cluster of economically framed issues, and another more heterogene-
ous framed cluster, comprising issues for which political, economic and cultural frames are 
more or less equally mobilized. 
 
As the results in Table 7 reveal, there are substantial differences in the framing patterns of the 
various party families.6 In addition to the information provided in the preceding tables, we 
also list the salience of parties’ positions at the bottom of Table 7. Comparing the two domi-
nant party groups, the Social democrats and the Conservatives, it is clear that they do not dif-
fer very much in their use of frames. However, their discrepancy in positions and salience is 
striking. The Social Democrats demonstrate clear, opposed positions for the two issue catego-
ries. So, while Table 5 suggested that the Social Democrats are in favor of the European inte-
                                                
6 In an additional analysis we regrouped the issues into economic and institutional issues not according to how 
they are framed (as we do in Table 7) but deductively on the basis of the content of the respective issues. We 
however got the same results as the ones we present in the next paragraphs. 
 26 
gration process overall, Table 7 reveals that they clearly oppose further economic integration. 
With 48 per cent of their stances framed in economic terms, they are the party-family that is 
most active on economic issues. The Conservatives, on the other hand, focus heavily on het-
erogeneously framed issues (44 per cent) and demonstrate comparatively low interest in the 
economic issues. Furthermore, the low values for their positions (0.07 and 0.24) indicate am-
bivalent attitudes among and within the different conservative parties. At the center of the 
political spectrum, the Liberals are clearly in favor of the European integration process, and 
demonstrate similar framing characteristics to those of the two large party groups. 
 
The three remaining party groups at the poles of the political scale, exhibit a significant devia-
tion from the pattern established by the dominant parties. The Greens show a consistent cul-
tural framing in both issue clusters. Remarkable is their constantly high share of moral-
universalistic frames that implies that this part of the Greens’ argumentation is due to their 
ideological heritage of New Social Movement beliefs and reasoning. The Radical left pursues 
a very consistent discourse, irrespective of the issues that are at the core of the debate—
perceiving European integration as a whole as predominantly economic. 
 
-- Table 7 about here -- 
 
As we already know, the seemingly inconsistent argumentation of the right-wing populist 
parties is due to one party, the Swiss People’s Party (SVP). More detailed analysis reveals 
that almost all of the stances on economic issues stem from the Swiss People’s Party (more 
than 90%) and that these positions are responsible for the Right-wing populists’ high share of 
economic framing. Thus, it appears that the SVP strategically restrains their identity-based 
core argument, whereas the other Right-wing populists insist on the same identity-based ar-
gumentation towards all issues. 
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Conclusion 
This article set out to disaggregate the debate on the European integration process, and to bet-
ter understand how this process is perceived by political parties in six Western European 
countries. By doing so, we did not simply look at who is in favor of the European integration 
process, or which characteristics of the particular actors might explain their positions. Much 
more radically, we worked to figure out which arguments were mobilized to support actors’ 
positions. To capture the extensive debate on the European integration process, we proposed 
an innovative and complex frame categorization that allowed us to verify different and de-
tailed hypotheses. Relying on a new and extensive dataset, we were in the position to look 
simultaneously at six different countries, various party groups, and all of the relevant issues 
that were debated in the period from 2004 to 2006.  
 
We came to the conclusion that the way political parties discuss the European integration pro-
cess depends strongly on their standing and positions. Overall, it appeared that the European 
integration process is perceived as a cultural and political entity as much as it is considered as 
an economic space. This proves true for both supporting and opposing statements—a finding 
that contradicts the expectations of authors who argue that economic frames are more preva-
lent among those with integration-positive attitudes, and cultural frames are more prevalent 
among those with negative attitudes towards the EU. We obtained a more nuanced picture 
when we analyzed individual party-families. There was a kind of ‘U’ pattern with regard to 
the use of frames: while established parties and the Greens used political arguments more 
often than economic ones (with the exceptions of the Social Democrats), the parties at the far 
left and the far right behaved contrariwise. With regard to cultural frames, it appeared that 
Right-wing populists used national-exclusive and national-institutional frames much more 
often than the other parties. All the other parties mainly used moral-universalist justifications. 
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As far as country-specific characteristics are concerned, we can conclude that the presence of 
right-wing populist forces and general Euroscepticism have no impact on the argumentation 
of established parties. At the same time, however, it is clear that political parties’ argumenta-
tion depends on the sub-issues that lie at the core of the debate at a specific moment. The 
mainstream parties appear to shift strategically, moving from an economic to a more cultural 
and political discourse depending on which sub-issue is at stake. Only the small parties of the 
Left—the Greens and Radical left—as well as the Right-wing populists (except the SVP) ap-
ply the same framing irrespective of the particular sub-issue debated. These parties consistent-
ly frame issues in line with their ideological beliefs—the Radical left in economic terms, and 
the Populist Right in cultural terms, relying squarely on nationalistic arguments. 
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Table 1: Frame structure 
utilitarian cultural 
pragmatic identity-based moral-universal 
political 
reasons 
eco-
nomic 
reasons 
other pragmat-
ic reasons 
national-
exclusive 
reasons 
national-
institutional 
reasons 
multicultural-
inclusive rea-
sons 
basic rights and 
general moral prin-
ciples 
 
 
Table 2: Example of the 'Nuclear Sentence' method 
Le Monde, Jan. 14, 2005: “Chirac est favorable à l'entrée de la Turquie dans l'Union européenne.“ (Chirac sup-
ports the EU accession of Turkey). 
actor direction issue 
Jacques Chirac +1 EU accession of Turkey 
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Table 3: Issue salience (percentages) and position by country  
Issues 
 
Austria 
 
United 
Kingdom 
France 
 
Germany 
 
Nether-
lands Switzerland 
EU-integration in general 5 8 6 6 6 7 
 0.02 -0.31 0.55 0.36 0.06 0.07 
       
Constitutional treaty 18 34 36 22 27 19 
 0.01 -0.32 -0.01 0.02 0.04 -0.29 
       
Enlargement  51 16 14 40 21 13 
(incl. eastern e., Turkey) -0.07 0.59 -0.34 0.00 0.00 0.15 
 
Budgetary framework 07-13 3 14 7 2 8 3 
 - -0.53 0.40 - -0.63 - 
 
Security  3 2 5 1 3 14 
(incl. Schengen) 0.15 0.04 0.66 - 0.07 0.28 
 
Monetary union  10 9 6 20 9 2 
(incl. stability pact) 0.32 -0.02 -0.06 0.08 0.43 - 
       
Market liberalization  2 2 10 0 3 3 
(incl. service directive) - 0.10 -0.68 - -0.22 -0.50 
       
Regulated capitalism  2 10 10 2 8 4 
(incl. CAP) - -0.78 0.59 - 0.07 0.17 
       
Free movement of persons 3 2 0 2 3 16 
 - -0.47 - - -0.04 0.35 
 
Bilateral treaties EU- 0 0 0 0 0 17 
Switzerland - - - - - 0.35 
       
Other Issues 4 3 5 6 12 3 
 - - - - - - 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Positions 0.00 -0.30 0.04 0.08 0.10 0.29 
N 2'076 1'602 4'006 1'722 2'539 2'493 
Notes: Issues with salience greater than 10 per cent are highlighted. Positions are only reported if N>15. The 
indicator ‘positions’ varies between ‘-1’ and ‘1’. In order to obtain a clear picture for every country, we have 
only included statements of national actors in this calculation. 
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Table 4: Framing by issues (percentages) 
 
 EU-integ. 
in general 
 
Constit. 
Treaty 
 
Enlarge-
ment 
 
Budget. 
framewrk 
 
Security 
(Schengen
) 
Monetary 
union 
 
Market 
liberaliz. 
 
Regul. 
capitalism 
 
Free mov. 
of persons 
 
Bilat. 
Treaties 
 
Total 
 
Political 
 
29 
 
37 
 
34 
 
37 
 
25 
 
28 
 
15 
 
21 
 
12 
 
36 
 
31 
 
Economic 
 
20 
 
19 
 
14 
 
19 
 
16 
 
64 
 
72 
 
52 
 
76 
 
38 
 
29 
 
Other pragmatic 
 
9 
 
4 
 
10 
 
0 
 
24 
 
0 
 
0 
 
6 
 
4 
 
5 
 
7 
 
Cultural 
 
42 
 
40 
 
41 
 
44 
 
34 
 
7 
 
13 
 
21 
 
8 
 
21 
 
33 
 
National-
exclusive 
5 
 
7 
 
9 
 
1 
 
4 
 
0 
 
3 
 
1 
 
5 
 
0 
 
5 
 
National-
institutional 
16 
 
8 
 
1 
 
1 
 
10 
 
2 
 
2 
 
3 
 
1 
 
4 
 
5 
 
Multicultural-
inclusive 
6 
 
7 
 
8 
 
14 
 
8 
 
2 
 
1 
 
3 
 
1 
 
1 
 
6 
 
Moral-
universalist 
15 
 
18 
 
23 
 
29 
 
13 
 
4 
 
6 
 
13 
 
2 
 
15 
 
17 
 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
N 809 3'006 2'702 429 718 746 731 870 612 371 11'649 
Notes: All categories have been weighted by country-weights. 
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Table 5: Framing by supporters/opponents and political parties (percentages) 
 
 Supporting 
positions 
Opposing  
positions 
Radical left Greens Social  
democrats 
Liberals Conservatives Right-wing 
populists 
Political 
 
32 29 17 35 34 39 39 16 
Economic 
 
28 31 50 9 33 19 20 30 
Other pragmatic 
 
9 4 2 21 7 7 5 9 
Cultural 
 
30 36 31 35 27 35 35 47 
National-
exclusive 
3 9 0 3 2 5 7 16 
National-
institutional 
3 9 11 4 4 6 6 22 
Multicultural-
inclusive 
7 4 
 
0 4 5 9 8 2 
Moral-
universalist 
17 16 20 25 16 15 15 7 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Positions   -0.51 0.48 0.15 0.41 0.12 -0.59 
N 6’916 4’383 160 289 1’902 669 2’391 521 
Notes: All categories have been weighted by country-weights. The categories ‘supporting and opposing positions’ include all actors present in the debate (not only political par-
ties) and summarize all positive and negative positions. The indicator ‘positions’ varies between ‘-1’ and ‘1’. 
 
The party-families consist of the following parties:  
Radical left: PCF, LCR, LO (F); PDS, Die Linke (D); SP (NL); PdA (CH) 
Greens: Die Grünen (A); Les verts (F); Die Grünen (D); Groen Links (NL); GPS (CH) 
Social-democrats: SPÖ (A); Labour (GB); PSF, MDC/MRC, MRG/PRG (F); SPD (D); PvdA (NL); SPS (CH) 
Liberals: Liberales Forum (A); LDP (GB); UDF (F); FDP (D); D66, VVD (NL); FDP, LPS (CH) 
Conservatives: ÖVP (A); Conservative Party (GB); UMP, RPR, RPF (F); CDU/CSU (D); CDA (NL); CVP (CH) 
Right-wing populists: BZÖ, FPÖ (A); FN, MNR, MPF (F); LPF, PVV (NL); SVP (CH) 
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Table 6: Framing by parties and countries (percentages) 
 
 Austria United 
Kingdom 
France Germany Netherlands Switzerland 
 
 
T T T RWP T T RWP T RWP 
Political 
 
30 31 19 15 38 36 16 21 13 
Economic 
 
31 30 39 14 29 17 11 46 51 
Other pragmatic 
 
9 7 2.0 8 9 7 16 11 12 
Cultural 
 
30 
 
32 
 
40 
 
63 
 
24 
 
39 
 
57 
 
21 
 
25 
 
National-
exclusive 
7 5 7 38 6 5 24 3 6 
National-
institutional 
7 10 4 16 0 8 14 7 13 
Multicultural-
inclusive 
3 3 9 0 6 8 13 1 0 
Moral-
universalist 
12 15 19 9 12 
 
18 6 11 5 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
N 323 389 2’155 140 340 1’385 63 1’278 238 
Notes: ‘T’ includes all frames used by political parties in the respective countries and ‘RWP’ those of Right-wing populists. In Austria, the United Kingdom and Germany the 
number of frames used by Right-wing populists was too small to make relevant statements. Only frames used by national political actors have been included. 
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Table 7: Framing by parties and issue-clusters (percentages) 
 
 Radical left Greens Social democrats Liberals Conservatives Right-wing  
populists 
Total 
d 
 
e d e d e d e d e d e d e 
Political 
 
20 8 38 17 39 20 37 43 41 28 13 14 38 23 
Economic 
 
51 57 3 47 20 59 12 35 14 57 13 61 16 56 
Other pragm. 
 
0 7 23 9 8 6 9 3 6 3 13 4 8 5 
Cultural 
 
28 28 35 27 33 16 42 19 39 13 61 21 39 17 
National-
exclusive 
0 0 4 0 2 1 7 3 8 3 19 10 6 3 
National-
institutional 
8 9 3 5 5 2 7 5 6 3 32 6 7 3 
Multicultural-
inclusive 
1 0 4 0 8 1 12 1 9 2 2 0 8 1 
Moral-
universalist 
19 18 25 22 18 12 17 11 16 5 7 6 17 10 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Positions –0.64 –0.48 0.48 0.51 0.34 –0.27 0.26 0.67 0.07 0.24 –0.81 –0.25   
N 108 45 225 57 1’263 571 443 160 1’795 444 344 169 4’217 1’451 
Salience (%) 2 2 7 3 33 48 8 9 44 26 7 12 100 100 
Notes: The diversely framed issues (d) include the issues EU-integration in general, constitutional treaty, enlargement, budgetary framework and security. The economically 
framed issues (e) consist of the issues monetary union, market liberalization, regulated capitalism, free movement of persons and the bilateral treaties. The residual category has 
been excluded. All categories and salience have been weighted by country-weights. The indicator ‘positions’ varies between ‘-1’ and ‘1’. The absolute numbers of negative and 
positive positions does not equal the overall number of frames as there are some neutral positions that have been excluded from the analyses.  
 
